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COMMENT
HOCKING V. DUBOIS: APPLYING TIRE SECURITIES LAWS TO
CONDOMINIUM RESALES
INTRODUCTION
Investing in non-owner occupied condominiums' has become increas-
ingly popular, in part because of the expanded use2 of rental pooling ar-
rangements ("RPA"). 3 Typically, a real estate developer sells both the
condominium and the RPA to a buyer.4 Because this arrangement has
certain investment characteristics, 5 it is generally considered to be the
sale of a security,6 and therefore subject to the strict disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws.
In Hocking v. Dubois,7 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ex-
tended this reasoning. Hocking held that a condominium resale coupled
with the sale of an RPA from an independent third party may' constitute
the sale of a security if a realtor presents the arrangement to a buyer as
part of the same transaction.9
Hocking, however, was decided by a slim majority.'" Judge Norris in
dissent found that the transaction did not constitute the sale of a secur-
ity." He maintained that a security may exist only if there is an affilia-
tion between the condominium seller and RPA operator. 2 In another
1. A condominium generally is a separately owned single unit in a multiple dwelling
with common elements. See 1 P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Condominium Law and Practice
§ 1.01(1), at 1-1 to 1-5 (1989).
2. See Comment, Looking Through Form to Substance. Are Montana Resort Condo-
miniums "Securities" 35 Mont. L. Rev. 265, 273 (1974).
3. A rental pooling arrangement is an agreement by which a third party is responsi-
ble for renting and managing all the property that participates in the pool. Each owner
subsequently receives a pro rata share of the rental income derived from the pool irre-
spective of whether the individual unit was actually rented. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885
F.2d 1449, 1453 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (en band), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr.
17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
4. See Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws--A
Case Study in Governmental Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785, 785-86 (1974).
5. These investment characteristics generally take the form of buyers who earn a
return on their condominium purchases through the managerial efforts of the developer.
See Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-5347, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 1049, at 2071 (Jan. 4, 1973).
6. See id.; Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1457.
7. 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S.
Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
8. In order for the transaction to constitute the sale of a security, a court will still
have to determine whether the transaction meets the investment contract test promul-
gated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See infra notes 18-34 and accom-
panying text.
9. See Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1457-58.
10. See id. at 1450, 1451 (6-5 decision).
11. See id. at 1463 (Norris, 3., dissenting).
12. See id. at 1463-64.
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dissent, Judge Wiggins asserted that absent an affiliation between the
condominium seller and the RPA operator, the RPA alone could consti-
tute the sale of a security."3 Consequently, he concluded that a buyer
could not recover against a realtor who was not affiliated with the RPA
operator.1
The Hocking decision contradicts the position of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 5 The SEC has stated that a condominium sale
coupled with an RPA constitutes the sale of a security where both agree-
ments are offered through "persons engaged in the business of building
and selling condominiums"'16 and the condominium seller and RPA op-
erator are affiliated.17
This Comment analyzes the Hocking decision and its effect on condo-
minium resales and RPAs. Part I examines the definition of a security
under the federal securities laws. Part II discusses the determination in
Hocking that condominium resales sold with RPAs may constitute the
sale of a security. Part III criticizes the Hocking decision and suggests
that an affiliation should exist between the condominium seller and RPA
operator before the transaction may be considered the sale of a security.
I. DEFINITION OF A SECURITY
In enacting the Securities Act of 1933 ("33 Act")" and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("34 Act"),19 Congress sought to protect investors
from unscrupulous promoters of securities.2' Consequently, the term
"security" was broadly defined to include not only stocks and bonds, but
also any investment contract.2 '
The Supreme Court first considered the scope of the term "investment
13. See id. at 1472 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 1473.
15. See Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-5347, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1049, at 2070 (Jan. 4,
1973).
16. Id. at 2070.
17. See SEC Amicus Curiae Brief on Rehearing En Bane at 8, Hocking v. Dubois,
885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17,
1990) (No. 89-1023) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Curiae Brie].
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1988).
19. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ll (1988).
20. See generally L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1-73 (2d ed. 1988)
(tracing development of federal securities laws).
21. Section 2(1) of the 33 Act defines a security as follows:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights... or, in gen-
eral, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certifi-
cate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
forgoing.
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contract" in SEC v. CM. Joiner Leasing Corp.2 In Joiner, land lessees
sold interests in oil and gas leases and, in order to increase property val-
ues, promised to drill test wells nearby.' After determining that the se-
curities acts did not specifically include divided interests in oil and gas
properties, the Court evaluated whether the leasehold interests were in-
vestment contracts . 4 The Court held that the transaction was an invest-
ment contract because the appreciation that the investors sought was
conditioned upon the promoter's drilling and discovering of oil in the
adjacent test wells.2-5 While Joiner did not specifically define an invest-
ment contract, the Court emphasized that the term should be broadly
construed.2
To clarify its decision in Joiner, the Supreme Court in SEC v. WJ.
Howey Co.27 developed a three-pronged test to determine whether an in-
vestment contract exists: "[an investment contract is] a contract, trans-
action or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the pro-
moter or third party."28 Once again, the Court sought to develop a flexi-
ble approach that was "capable of adaption to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits."'2 9
Subsequent decisions, while relying on the Howey test, have expanded
its terms. For example, while the first element of the test requires an
investment of money, an investor need not actually invest cash to satisfy
this prong of the test.30
There is disagreement, however, concerning the criteria that will sat-
isfy the second prong of the Howey test-the requirement that the invest-
15 U.S.C. § 77b(i) (1988).
A virtually identical definition is contained in the 34 Act. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
22. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
23. See id. at 346.
24. See id. at 348-49.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 351.
27. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, small orange grove plots were sold to non-resi-
dents who lacked the experience or desire to manage the groves. See id. at 295-96.
Through an affiliated company, the promoters offered the buyers management services
agreements through which the promoters would cultivate the groves and sell the fruit on
the owners' behalf. See id. at 294-95. The Court held that the land sales and service
contracts together constituted investment contracts subject to the provisions of the secur-
ities acts. See id. at 300.
28. Id. at 298-99.
29. Id. at 299.
30. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979)
("This is not to say that a person's 'investment,' in order to meet the definition of an
investment contract, must take the form of cash only, rather than of goods and serv-
ices."); Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976) ("an investment of money
means only that the investor must commit his assets to the enterprise in such a manner as
to subject himself to financial loss"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016 (1978).
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ment be in a common enterprise.31 Some decisions require "horizontal
commonality," which is a pooling of assets from two or more investors
into a single fund.32 Others also accept "vertical commonality," which is
a relationship between investors and promoters in which the investors
depend on the promoters' expertise, rather than on the fortuity of collec-
tive investments by other investors, for their profits.33
The third element of the Howey test-that the investor be led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of others-is sometimes overly mechanical.
These decisions focus instead on whether the promoter has made signifi-
cant managerial efforts in procuring profits for the investor.34
II. THE HOCKING DECISION
In Hocking, a buyer relied on a realtor to find a condominium for aninvestment.3 1 On the realtor's suggestion, the buyer purchased a unit in
a resort complex. 36 During negotiations, the realtor informed the buyer
that an RPA was available through an independent third party.3 The
realtor provided the buyer with information about the daily average
31. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115-16 (1985) (White, 3., dissenting
from a denial of certiorari).
32. See, eg., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216,
222 (6th Cir. 1980) (pooling of investor's assets essential to finding that common-enter-
prise element exists), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research
Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977) (common enterprise requires multiple
investors sharing assets); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1070-71
(M.D. Pa. 1972) (pooling of investor funds for common purpose results in common enter-
prise), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974); see also L.
Loss, supra note 20, at 189 n.1 (describing horizontal commonality as relationship among
investors).
33. See, eg., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.
1974) (common enterprise determined by investor's dependency on promoter's expertise);
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (common enter-
prise exists where investor's profits are dependent upon promoter's efforts); El Khadem v.
Equity Sees. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.) (common enterprise results when
investor's profits are dependent on those seeking investments), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900
(1974); see also L. Loss, supra note 20, at 189 n.1 (describing vertical commonality as
relationship between investors and promoters).
34. See, eg., SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582-83 (2d Cir.) (securi-
ties-law protection extended to investors who retain limited control over investments),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (investment contract exists where promoter's efforts are essential to pro-
ject); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3rd Cir. 1973) (investment contract
present even though all duties not performed by promoter); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) ("the word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or
literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed
realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which involve in sub-
stance, if not form, securities"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). But see Villeneuve v.
Advanced Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (1lth Cir. 1983) (investment
contract exists only when profits are derived solely from the promoter's efforts).
35. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. de-
nied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
36. See id.
37. See id.
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rental and assured him that the rental would be taken care of by the
RPA.38 Shortly after the condominium purchase, the realtor presented
the buyer with the RPA agreement, which he signed.39 The buyer made
the installment payments due on the condominium, but forfeited his in-
vestment when the balloon payment4° became due.41
The buyer sued the realtor, claiming that the realtor's misrepresenta-
tions42 caused his investment loss.43 Specifically, the buyer alleged viola-
tions of Section 12" and Section 1711 of the 33 Act, and Rule lOb-546 of
the 34 Act.4 7
The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the condominium
resale and RPA combination was not an investment contract because the
condominium purchase was not conditioned on the buyer's participation
in the RPA.48 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that an "offering of a condominium with an RPA automatically
makes the [transaction an investment contract]."'49
On rehearing en bane, the Ninth Circuit held that in order to deter-
mine whether an investment contract exists, the condominium resale and
RPA must be analyzed as one transaction for the purposes of the Howey
test."0 Hocking distinguished between situations in which a realtor
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1453.
40. A balloon payment is the final payment of principal under a balloon note. A
balloon note is a promissory note that generally calls for minimum payments of principal
and interest at regular intervals, but requires the entire payment of principal at the end of
the term. See M. Jennings, Real Estate Law 350 (2d ed. 1989).
41. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. de-
nied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
42. Two of the alleged misrepresentations pertained to the condominium purchase.
First, the buyer alleged that the agent misrepresented that the condominium would be
purchased directly from the developer when, in fact, the buyer purchased the condomin-
ium on resale. Second, the buyer alleged that the agent overestimated the value of the
condominium. See Joint Brief for Appellees on Rehearing En Bane at 23, Hocking v.
Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S.
Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
43. See Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1451.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(1988) (imposing civil liability for violation of registration and
prospectus delivery requirements or for false and misleading statements in connection
with sale of security).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988) (imposing civil liability for use of scheme to defraud,
use of false statements of material fact or omission to state material fact in connection
with sale of security).
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989) (imposing civil liability for use of deceptive
means in order to defraud, use of false statements of material fact or failure to state a
material fact in connection with purchase or sale of security).
47. See Joint Brief for Appellees on Rehearing En Bane at 22, Hocking v. Dubois,
885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17,
1990) (No. 89-1023).
48. See Hocking v. Dubois, No. 83-823, slip op. at 3 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 1985).
49. Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 565 (9th Cir.) (emphasis in original), with-
drawn, 863 F.2d 654 (1988).
50. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cer.
denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
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"merely provides information"5 regarding an RPA and cases in which
the realtor presents information as "part of the same transaction."52 The
former would not constitute an investment contract but the latter
could. 3 Because the Ninth Circuit concluded that the realtor presented
the buyer with information about the RPA as part of the same transac-
tion, it determined that the condominium resale and RPA formed one
transaction for the purposes of the Howey test and that an investment
contract may have existed54 if all of the Howey prerequisites were met.55
The Hocking majority relied on Blackwell v. Bensten5 6 to find that the
condominium resale and RPA were part of the same transaction for the
purposes of the Howey test.5  In Blackwell, investors bought land to de-
velop into small citrus groves.5" Shortly after the purchase, the investors
executed a management services contract with a management company
that agreed to plaint and market the citrus crop. 9 Both the seller and the
management company were organized by and operated under the same
ownership.' ° The investors subsequently brought an action alleging vio-
lations of the 33 Act.61 Blackwell held that the arrangement was an in-
vestment contract and stated that although the sales and management
agreements were "separate in form and execution, [they were] closely
allied in performance, as well as in personnel. They form[ed] constituent
parts of what [was] essentially one transaction." 62
The Hocking court evaluated the circumstances before it in the same
manner as did the Blackwell court.6' The majority in Hocking agreed
that the transactions were separate in form because the buyer purchased
the condominium and RPA from different parties." t Nonetheless, be-
cause the realtor offered the condominium and RPA to the buyer as part
of the same arrangement, Hocking concluded that the condominium re-
sale and RPA formed one transaction for the purposes of the Howey test,
51. Id. at 1458.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1457-58.
54. The court proceeded to apply the Howey test to the transaction and concluded
that, for summary judgment purposes, the buyer had met the first and second prongs of
the test and at least raised material issues of fact with regard to the test's third prong. See
Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1459-62 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023). Consequently, the court remanded
the case to the district court for a trial on the merits. See id. at 1462.
55. For a discussion of the Howey prerequisites necessary for an investment contract
to exist, see supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
56. 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
57. See Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1458 n.7.
58. See Blackwell, 203 F.2d at 691.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 692.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 692-93.
63. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1458 n.7 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (UJ.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
64. See id. at 1457-58.
1126 [Vol. 58
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and therefore, could constitute the sale of a security.65
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOCKING DECISION
A. Critique of the Hocking Holding
Hocking is unpersuasive because it is based on a misreading of
Blackwell v. Bentsen. 6 .Blackwell held that sales and management agree-
ments formed one transaction for the purposes of the Howey test because
the agreements were "closely allied in performance, as well as in person-
nel."67 In Blackwell, the land-sale and management contracts were
closely allied in performance because the development company sold the
land for its income value, which was to be derived from the efforts of the
management company, rather than for its intrinsic value.63 The develop-
ment company and the management services operator were closely allied
in personnel because they were commonly owned.69
In contrast, the realtor and RPA operator in Hocking were neither
closely allied in performance nor in personnel. The realtor's perform-
ance was not tied to that of the RPA operator because the condominium
purchase was not dependent on the RPA for its value. In fact, the
buyer's sole investment motive for purchasing the condominium was to
profit from its expected appreciation.Y In addition, there was no affilia-
tion between the realtor and RPA operator.71 The realtor merely in-
formed the buyer of the RPA's existence, but had nothing to do with its
terms or provisions.72 Under the circumstances, the condominium resale
and RPA should have been considered two separate transactions for the
purposes of the Howey test.
Hocking also established an illusory distinction between a realtor who
"merely provides information" and a realtor who presents information as
"part of the same transaction." The court determined that the realtor
presented information about the RPA to the buyer as part of a single
transaction.73 The circumstances in Hocking, however, are indistinguish-
65. See Id. at 1458.
66. 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); see Hocking,
885 F.2d at 1467 (Norris, J., dissenting). In addition, in the other real estate cases cited
by the Hocking majority to support its conclusion, there was a link between the real estate
seller and the management services operator that did not exist under the facts in Hocking.
See, eg., SEC v. W.L Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294-95 (1946) (promoter sells orange
groves and company under his direct common control offers to grow, harvest and sell
oranges); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1980)
(investor purchased land from company that promised to develop property).
67. Blackwell, 203 F.2d at 693 (emphasis added).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 692-93.
70. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cent de-
nied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
71. See id. at 1456.
72. See id. at 1452.
73. See Id. at 1458. In the course of the condominium sale in Hocking, the realtor
advised the buyer of the availability and investment potential of the RPA, helped the
11271990]
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able from most real estate transactions in which the buyer needs to know
about a property's income potential and the availability of management
services.74
The consequence of the Hocking decision is that almost every condo-
minium resale that involves an RPA will be considered part of the same
transaction for the purposes of the Howey test and, therefore, may impli-
cate the federal securities laws. This result will discourage realtors from
being candid and fully informed. Realtors normally possess useful infor-
mation about RPAs that should be available to buyers.75 Under Hock-
ing, however, realtors who offer any information about the availability of
an RPA may be engaging in the sale of an investment contract, and thus
may be subject to the burdensome registration and disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws. 76 The responsibility for complying
with these requirements will discourage realtors from providing investors
with useful information about the availability of RPAs. 7 The federal
securities laws were intended to increase the availability of information
to investors,78 not to discourage realtors from providing prospective buy-
ers with as much relevant information as possible to help them make
informed judgments. 9
buyer prepare the RPA application and offered to resell the condominium in the future.
See id. at 1467 (Norris, L, dissenting).
74. See id. at 1467.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1468. These requirements would obligate the realtor to pass a general
securities examination and compel the realtor's agency to comply with net capital rules,
reporting, record-keeping and "other regulatory provisions which serve little or no valid
purpose in this context." Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: A Case Study in Governmental Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785, 787, 797-98
(1974); see also Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Per-
spective, 62 Geo. L.L 1403, 1413-23 (1974) (discussing registration and disclosure re-
quirements under securities acts).
77. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1989) (en band) (Norris,
J., dissenting), cert denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023); cf.
Brief for the National Association of Realtors in Support of Petition for Rehearing En
Banc at 5, Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W.
3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023) (burden of compliance with federal securities
law requirements will discourage real estate agents from participating in condominium
sales).
78. See Note, supra note 76, at 1404.
79. See Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1467 (Norris, ., dissenting); cf. United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (securities acts focus on securities sales
intended to raise capital for profit-making purposes); SEC v. W.L Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 299 (1946) (purpose of securities acts is to regulate conduct of those "who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits"); Berman & Stone, Federal Securi-
ties Law and the Sale of Condominiums, Homes, and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 412
(1975) (concern regarding possible misapplication of securities acts to real estate sales);
Note, supra note 76, at 1405 (dominant purpose of the securities laws is "to regulate the
various schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others with the lure of
profits").
[Vol. 581128
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B. Affiliation Between the Parties
In determining whether a condominium resale and RPA form one
transaction for the purposes of the Howey test, the inquiry should focus
on whether there is an affiliation between the two arrangements. Nor-
mally, when real property is sold as a residence or without management
services, the transaction does not involve the sale of an investment con-
tract.80 This is true primarily because these transactions are not "pre-
mised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."8" Where real property is
sold with a management-services agreement offered by the seller or a
company affiliated with the seller, however, many decisions have found
that an investment contract may exist.8 2
Requiring an affiliation between the condominium seller and RPA op-
erator establishes a precise standard that draws the line between condo-
minium resales that may involve an investment contract and those that
do not.8 3 An investment contract will not exist when the realtor is not
affiliated with anyone who provides management services, while an in-
vestment contract may exist when there is an affiliation between the con-
dominium seller and RPA operator.84 In contrast, Hocking's distinction
80. See, ag., Forman, 421 U.S. at 858 (sale of cooperative apartments sold by non-
profit corporation, where purchasers sought place to live, does not involve sale of invest-
ment contract); Dumbarton Condominium Assoc. v. 3120 R Street Assoc., 657 F. Supp.
226, 230 (D.D.C. 1987) (investment contract does not exist where condominium seller
did not promise to market or lease property on buyer's behalf); Mosher v. Southridge
Assoc. Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (W.D. Penn. 1982) (investment contract does not
exist where buyer has sole discretion to rent condominium); Joyce v. Ritchie Tower
Properties, 417 F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (condominium to be occupied by pur-
chaser as residence does not involve sale of investment contract).
81. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; see also Bender v. Continental Towers Ltd., 632 F.
Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (real estate has inherent worth whereby appreciation
depends on ordinary economic variables rather than on promoters' efforts).
82. See, eg., SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1946) (investment con-
tract exists where promoter sells property and offers management services through affili-
ated company that is under direct common control of promoters); Cameron v. Outdoor
Resorts of Am., Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1979) (investment contract exists
where promoter sells campsites and retains exclusive right to rent campsites in owner's
absence) aff'dper curtiam on reheating, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980); Blackwell v. Bent-
sen, 203 F.2d 690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1953) (investment contract exists where developer
sells property and commonly owned company offers management services), cert. dis-
missed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); Hodges v. H & R Investments, 668 F. Supp. 545, 550-51(N.D. Miss. 1987) (investment contract exists when promoter of condominium guaran-
tees buyer minimum rental income); Wooldridge Homes Inc. v. Bronze Tree Inc., 558 F.
Supp. 1085, 1087-89 (D. Colo. 1983) (investment contract exists where promoter sells
resort property with promise to build condominiums and provide management services to
purchasers for two years); see also H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate
Law § 2.04(1) at 2-26 (rev. ed. 1990) ("The constantly recurring situation that gives rise
to an investment contract is the purported sale of specific property ... accompanied by an
arrangement under which the promoters.., manage the entire operation.").
83. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, 3.,
dissenting), cert denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
84. See id.
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between a realtor who "merely provide[s] information" and a realtor
who provides information as "part of the same transaction" is over-
broad."5 Realtors who do nothing more than notify prospective condo-
minium purchasers about the availability of an RPAs6 may find
themselves in federal court defending actions brought under the federal
securities laws.87
Requiring an affiliation between the condominium seller and RPA op-
erator is supported by the SEC, 8 which has stated that "[t]he offer of
real estate... without any collateral arrangements with the seller [of
residential real estate] or others, does not involve the offer of a secur-
ity."8 9 In Hocking, the SEC maintained that "[s]ince in this case there is
no suggestion of an affiliation... between the sellers of the condominium
[or realtor] and the operator of the rental pool, the sale of the condomin-
85. See id. at 1466 (Norris, 3., dissenting).
86. Buyers may still enjoy securities law protection when they are misled by unscru-
pulous RPA operators because the courts may apply the Howey test to the RPA itself to
determine whether an investment contract exists. In this situation, the initial condomin-
ium purchase, irrespective of its relationship to any other financial arrangement, would
not implicate the federal securities laws. See, eg., United Housing Found., Inc. v. For-
man, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (cooperative apartments sold by non-profit corporation where
purchasers sought place to live does not involve sale of investment contract); Joyce v.
Ritchie Tower Properties, 417 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. IMI. 1976) (condominium to be occupied
by purchasers as residence does not involve sale of investment contract). Once the buyer
commits the use of the property to the RPA operator, however, the first prong of the
Howey test-an investment of money-would be satisfied. See, eg., SEC v. WJ. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (first prong of Howey test satisfied by investors foregoing
use of land, rather than by purchasing land that was incidental to investment); Hocking,
885 F.2d at 1471 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (first prong of Howey test satisfied once buyer
commits condominium to rental pool). The satisfaction of the second and third prongs of
the Howey test would depend upon the type of RPA the buyer entered into and the
amount of control the buyer retained over the use of his condominium. See Hocking, 885
F.2d at 1471 (Wiggins, J., dissenting); see also Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc.,
608 F.2d 187, 191-93 (5th Cir. 1979) (investment contract exists where promoter is given
exclusive right to rent campsite in owner's absence), aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 611
F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally Note, The Economic Realities of Condominium
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 747, 772-75 (1985) (eco-
nomic realities of investment contracts depend on type of rental agreement and amount
of control retained by owner).
87. See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1465 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J.,
dissenting), cert denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
88. See SEC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 17, at 8.
89. Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Ex-
change Act Release No. 33-5347, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 11049, at 2071 (Jan. 4,
1973). The SEC has expressed this view on many occasions. For example, the SEC's
Division of Corporate Finance has declined to take a "no-action" position where there
was an affiliation between the developer and RPA operator. See, eg., SEC No-Action
Letter, Little Squaw Mountain Township (Apr. 25, 1973) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (rental pool operated by subsidiary of developer); SEC No-Action Letter, Inter-
Mack-Pall Ke Kua Condominiums (Mar. 29, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)(rental pool operated by agent employed by developer).
The only exception to the SEC's approach was Embarcadero, SEC No-Action Letter,[1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 80,956 (Dec. 3, 1976), where the
Division declined to take a "no-action" position in a condominium resale although there
appeared to be no affiliation between the seller of the condominium and the rental pool
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ium was not a transaction that involved an investment contract."'9 Tra-
ditionally, courts accord considerable weight to SEC views governing the
applicability of the securities laws.91
Although it is apparent that an affiliation must exist between the con-
dominium seller and RPA operator for a joint transaction to constitute
the sale of an investment contract, it is essential to define what type of
affiliation between the parties is necessary for the sales and management
agreements to form one transaction for the purposes of the Howey test.9"
Clear connections between the condominium seller and RJPA operator
should be scrutinized carefully. For example, a selling arrangement be-
tween the realtor and RPA operator may establish a clear connection
between the parties where the realtor, while selling the condominium to
the buyer, also receives a commission from the RPA operator for selling
an RPA to the buyer.93 An agency relationship between the realtor and
RPA operator, in which the realtor has the authority to bind the RPA
operator to an agreement with the buyer, may also establish a sufficient
connection between the parties for the sales and management agreements
to form one transaction for Howey purposes.94 Finally, a proper link
between the parties may also be established through the presence of com-
panies that are closely allied in performance and personnel, such as man-
agement companies under the direct common control 95 of or owned96 by
sales companies.
operator. The present SEC staff, however, disagrees with that result. See SEC Amicus
Curiae Brief, supra note 17, at 14 n.5.
When no afriliation was present between the condominium seller and management
services operator, the SEC has taken a no-action position. See, e-g., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, Terrace Hills Condominium (Sept. 29, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file)
(optional rental pool available from an entity that has no business relationship with
developer).
90. SEC.Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 17, at 11.
91. See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975);
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-
27 (1971); Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1465 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J.,
dissenting), cert denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990) (No. 89-1023).
92. See Note, Profits in Paradise: When Resort Condominiums Qualify as Investment
Contracts, 19 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 177, 232 n.317 (1989).
93. See, eg., Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1463 (Norris, J., dissenting) (suggesting that sales
and management agreements form one transaction under Howay test when selling ar-
rangement exists between realtor and RPA operator); SEC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra
note 17, at 8.
94. See, e.g., Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1469 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (suggesting that sales
and management agreements form one transaction under the Howey test where agent has
authority to bind RPA operator to agreement with buyer).
95. See, eg., SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (investment contract pres-
ent where promoter sells property and offers management services through affiliated com-
pany that is under direct common control of promoters).
96. See, eg., Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953) (investment contract
exists where developer sells property and commonly owned company offers management
services), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
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CONCLUSION
In Hocking v. Dubois, the Ninth Circuit held that an investment con-
tract may exist when a condominium resale is coupled with the sale of an
RPA from an independent party. This conclusion is unfounded. In its
analysis, the Ninth Circuit misread precedent, created illusory distinc-
tions, and established a standard that will unfairly burden realtors with
federal securities registration and disclosure requirements.
As an alternative to the approach taken in Hocking, subsequent deci-
sions should focus on whether there is a sufficient affiliation between the
condominium seller and RPA operator such that the arrangement may
be considered one transaction for the purposes of the Howey test. This
approach will help to insure that realtors are not unfairly subjected to the
requirements of the federal securities laws.
Edward T DeSilva
